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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-1344
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL EUGENE BEGIN, a/k/a Mike

Michael Eugene Begin,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-10-cr-00022-001)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 24, 2013
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: October 1, 2013)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________

FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Michael Eugene Begin appeals from a sentence imposed by the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. For the reasons stated
below, we will affirm.
I.
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary
to our analysis.
On October 12, 2010, Begin pled guilty to charges related to his use of the internet
and a cellular phone to send sexual messages and photographs to a minor in order to
persuade her to have sex with him. Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation
Office prepared a presentence report (“PSR”), which categorized his offense level at 32
and his criminal history category at IV, resulting in a guidelines range of 168 to 210
months in prison. The government filed a motion for an upward departure from the
advisory guidelines range, arguing that the recommended range underrepresented the
severity of Begin’s criminal history. Begin, on the other hand, sought a downward
variance based upon the disparity between his guidelines range and the sentence that he
would have faced in either state or federal court had he actually committed statutory rape.
At Begin’s sentencing hearing, the District Court heard testimony and oral
argument regarding Begin’s criminal history. Based upon the testimony presented, the
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Court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Begin had engaged in several
sexual assaults for which the PSR had not accounted, two of which involved victims
under the age of sixteen. App. 154. It also described the details of Begin’s assault on a
seven-year-old when he was sixteen years of age as “particularly egregious.” App. 154.
The Court then granted the government’s motion for an upward departure, describing
Begin’s criminal history as “lengthy, continuous” and “primarily focused on sexually
assaulting minor females.” App. 154-55. It increased Begin’s criminal history category
to V, making the applicable Guidelines range 188 to 235 months imprisonment, and
made a further upward departure to reflect the seriousness of the sexual abuse in which
Begin had engaged. After finding that the appropriate range for Begin spanned from 188
to 240 months of imprisonment, the Court sentenced Begin to a 240-month term of
imprisonment. It found that the sentence was “sufficient but not greater than necessary,”
and “adequately addresse[d] the nature and circumstances of this offense, as well as the
history and background of the Defendant.” App. 168. It further noted that “[t]his
sentence also takes into account the need to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentencing
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”
App. 169-70.
Begin timely appealed his sentence and conviction to this Court, arguing that his
sentence was procedurally unsound because the District Court failed to discuss, or even
rule on, his request for a downward variance in light of “the need to avoid unwarranted
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sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct.” United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012). After
concluding that only Begin’s federal-federal disparity argument had “colorable legal
merit,” we held that the District Court had failed to make a sufficient record to
demonstrate its consideration of that argument. Id. at 414. We observed that a “rote
recitation of § 3553(a)(6) is insufficient to permit us to review the Court’s resolution of
Begin’s disparity arguments.” Id. We therefore vacated Begin’s sentence as
“procedurally unsound” and remanded for resentencing. Id.
The resentencing hearing was held on January 22, 2013. After hearing oral
argument from both parties regarding Begin’s variance request, the District Court stated:
I think counsel on both sides did a good job. And, Mr. Patton, I commend
you for the points you raise here, but I must say that I, ultimately, cannot
agree with changing the sentence. As I said before, I granted the
government’s upward departure motion and, ultimately, determined that the
appropriate offense level was 32 and the appropriate criminal history
category was Roman numeral V. Thus, making the applicable Guideline
range one hundred eighty-eight to two hundred thirty-five months of
imprisonment. And then added another upward departure on that, making
it ultimately, two hundred forty months . . . I’m going to deny here the
request from Mr. Patton for a downward variance.
App. 197. The Court also noted:
We further believe the extensiveness of his overall criminal history underrepresent [sic] his actual history when compared to similar defendants.
Finally, we believe that the defendant’s criminal history does seriously
under-represent the likelihood that he will commit other crimes. His
criminal history is lengthy, continuous, and primarily focused on assaulting
minor females . . . I believe now that the sentence does take into account
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the need to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentencing among defendants
with similar records that have been found guilty of similar conduct.
App. 206-07. It then re-imposed the same sentence. Begin’s second timely notice of
appeal to this Court followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion, which
proceeds in two stages of analysis. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir.
2009) (en banc). We first review for procedural error, ensuring that the district court:
(1) correctly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range; (2) appropriately
considered any motions for a departure under the Guidelines; and (3) gave meaningful
consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v.
Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011). If the sentencing decision passes the first stage
of review, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the decision. United States
v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). Our substantive review focuses on the
totality of the circumstances. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.
III.
A.
Begin argues that the District Court’s resentencing was procedurally unsound
because, although the Court ruled on Begin’s downward variance request, it failed to give
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“thorough and meaningful consideration” to his argument. Specifically, Begin argues
that, on remand, this Court was looking for an answer to why the sentence for a crime that
was not consummated should be greater than the sentence for a crime that was
consummated. We disagree.
When a district court sentences a defendant, it “must produce a record sufficient to
demonstrate its rational and meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.” Begin,
696 F.3d at 411 (citing United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2010)).
The record, taken in its entirety, must make clear that the district court “has considered
the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Merced, 603 F.3d at 215-16 (quoting Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). It is not necessary that the district court “raise every
conceivable issue on its own initiative” or even “discuss every argument raised by a
litigant if an argument is clearly without merit.” Id. at 215. “However, if a party raises a
colorable argument about the applicability of one of the § 3553(a) factors, the district
court may not ignore it.” Id. Thus, “the court must acknowledge and respond to any
properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual
basis.” United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007). While the court’s
response to each argument need not be perfect, Merced, 603 F.3d at 215, “a rote
statement that the court has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors is not a sufficient
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response to a specific colorable argument.” Begin, 696 F.3d at 411 (citing United States
v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006)).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court gave thorough and
meaningful consideration to Begin’s downward variance argument at the resentencing
hearing. When the District Court first sentenced Begin, it merely reiterated § 3553(a)(6),
stating: “This sentence also takes into account the need to avoid unwarranted disparities
in sentencing among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct.” App. 169-70. This statement alone, without adequate justification, was
insufficient to allow proper appellate review of Begin’s disparity argument. We did not,
as Begin argues, remand the case for the District Court to address, specifically, why the
sentence for a crime that was not consummated should be greater than the sentence for a
crime that was consummated. Rather, we sought a clear justification on the record as to
how the Court considered § 3553(a)(6), which it articulated at the resentencing hearing.
After hearing oral argument and recessing for ten minutes, the District Court
addressed each party’s arguments, granted the government’s request for an upward
departure, and denied Begin’s request for a downward variance. In considering
§ 3553(a)(6), the Court distinguished Begin’s extensive criminal history from that of
similar defendants, identifying specific instances of Begin’s “particularly egregious”
conduct. In this regard, it highlighted its belief that “the extensiveness of [Begin’s]
overall criminal history under-represent[ed] his actual history when compared to similar
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defendants.” App. 206-07. For that reason, the Court denied Begin’s request for a
downward variance, instead imposing multiple enhancements to the guidelines range.
Our review of the record reveals that it gave thorough and meaningful consideration to
Begin’s downward variance argument at the resentencing hearing. Because Begin
disputes only the District Court’s analysis of § 3553(a)(6), and the record does not
indicate any other procedural errors in its resentencing, we conclude that the resentencing
was not procedurally unreasonable.
Since the District Court’s sentencing decision passed the first stage of review, we
now turn to the substantive reasonableness of the decision. Levinson, 543 F.3d at 195.
Here, the Court clearly identified numerous instances in Begin’s past that justified its
upward departure from the advisory guidelines, describing his past conduct as
“particularly egregious” and highlighting Begin’s criminal past compared to similar
defendants. Because we cannot say that “no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on [Begin] for the reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt provided,”
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568, we conclude that the sentence was substantively reasonable.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and resentencing.
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